Beijing Model (BM) remains a critical challenge in the literature. The challenge is even more demanding when emerging development paradigms like the Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP) and New Structural Economics (NSE) schools have to be integrated. While the latter has recognized both State and market failures but failed to provide a unified theory, the former has left the challenging concern of how institutional diversity matter in the development process. We synthesize perspectives from recently published papers on development and Sino-African relations in order to present the relevance of both the WC and BM in the long-term and short-run respectively. While the paper postulates for a unified theory by reconciling the WC and the BM to complement the NSE, it at the same time presents a case for economic rights and political rights as short-run and long-run development priorities respectively. By attempting to reconcile the WC with the BM, the study contributes at the same to macroeconomic NSE literature of unifying a development theory and to the LIP literature on institutional preferences with stages of development. Hence, the proposed reconciliation takes into account the structural and institutional realities of nations at different stages of the process of development. JEL Classification: B10; O11; O19; O55
Introduction
The success and burgeoning economic prosperity of China over the past decades has led to growing debates in academic and policy making circles over the relevance of the Washington Consensus (WC) in 21 st century development 1 . Narratives have varied from, inter alia: lost decades with the WC (Fofack, 2014) ; the Beijing Model (BM) more adapted to the 21 st century (Nijs, 2008; Huang, 2010) ; development strategies based on a mixture of the WC and other successful development strategies (Fosu, 2013a) ; preferences in economic versus political rights in a development approach (Moyo, 2013) ; while institutions promote economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2015 (Acemoglu et al., , 2017 , institutions could be more endogenous to economic prosperity in Africa (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014) and; scale of preference in rights between developing and developed countries in the era of globalization (Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014a) .
The debates have largely erupted because a strand of authors maintains that the poor performance of some developing countries is traceable to the WC (Fofack, 2014, p. 6) . The WC that is based on government failures includes policies of marketisation, privitisation and liberalization (inter alia), while the BM is based on government regulation and prudence in liberalization and privatization (Nijs, 2008) . Akomolafe (2008) has suggested that developing countries should stop looking at the West for instructions because China which is now prospering at breath-taking pace was in a similar economic stalemate as most African countries about five decades ago. However, while it opted to recourse to internal solutions to address its economic issues, Africa decided to follow prescriptions from the WC. The disappointment in development has led to growing distrust in Western policies, coupled with amongst others: colonialism, slavery, manipulations during the Cold war, corruption by companies from the West and, neocolonialism (Robinson, 2009) . Moreover, the relevance of this study is also consolidated by the recent international financial crisis, the launching of the New Development Bank as well as the Belt and Road Initiative which are contributing towards rethinking and reshaping the global architecture of international cooperation and governance (Das, 2008; Garnaut et al., 2009; Huang, 2016) .
China has responded to the above growing frustrations by carefully tailoring its foreign policy to reflect opposite feelings. China's unconditional and non-interference approach is igniting a lot of interest in the tendencies of Sino-African relations Asche et al., 2008; Besada et al., 2008; Biggeri et al., 2009; Ortmann, 2012) . Moreover the 1 The terms models and paradigms are used interchangeably throughout the study. and suggesting strategies and solutions to the documented policy syndromes (Asongu & Ssozi, 2016) .
In light of the above, this study is a response to the need for building complementarities between the WC and the BM. This is essentially because the WC prescriptions to African countries during the past 30 years have largely not delivered on the promises (Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Asongu, 2012; Darley, 2012) . Hence, it is politically correct for China to use this frustration as an instrument in its foreign policy.
The present study which focuses on the complementarity between the WC and BM also departs from documented African-oriented development models. These include: the Africa's Priority for Economic Recovery (APPER, 1986 (APPER, -1990 ; the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development (LPA, 1980-200) ; the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990) ; the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP, 1989) ; the 2001 NEPAD (OAU, 1980 (OAU, , 2001 Adedeji, 2002; Bujra, 2004) ; more self-reliance by African countries for better development (Fofack, 2014) and a stream of studies on development strategies covered by Fosu (2013a) .
In the light of the above, this study contributes to the extant literature in the following ways: definition of the WC and the BM; reconciliation of dominant development models in the short-term and long-term and postulation of a unified theory of economic development.
The paper postulates a unified theory that reconciles the WC and the BM and also presents a case for economic rights and political rights as short-run and long-run development priorities, respectively 2 . The rest of the study is presented as follows. The views are presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the resulting agenda while Section 4 concludes.
Views on multi-polar development strategies
Over the past decades, much has been documented on the causes of poor economic development in Africa (Englebert, 2002; Jerven, 2011; Kodila-Tedika & Agbor, 2014; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017) . Some of the reasons from the attendant literature include: social setbacks to technological improvements and economic prosperity according to Amavilah (2015) . Amavilah (2014 Amavilah ( , 2006 and Lewis (1955) have focused on the loss of traditional institutions in the continent while Nunn (2008 ) and Nunn and Puga (2012 have established that deinstitutionalization is a fundamental cause of the poverty tragedy in Africa. According to Amavilah (2015) , the absence of an apparent distinction between "private use rights" and "private property rights" also explains the underdevelopment issues experienced by the continent. Other documented factors are: undervaluation of local knowledge in comparison to foreign knowledge (Brush & Stabinsky, 1996; Lwoga et al., 2010; Raseroka, 2008; Tchamyou, 2017; Amavilah et al., 2017) ; low exploration and exploitation of natural resources (Doftman, 1939; Lewis, 1955; Amavilah, 2014) ; the inaccurate economics based on preconditions (Monga, 2014) as well as unfavorable ramifications of colonization (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013) ; inability of governments to acknowledge that resources are scarce (Dorfman, 1939; Lewis, 1955; Lucas, 1993; America, 2013; Looney, 2013; Drine, 2013) and excessive purchase of luxury commodities by government officials (Adewole & Osabuohien, 2007; Efobi et al., 2013) . Lin (2015) , Asongu and Ssozi (2016) and Asongu and le Roux, (2019) have been concerned with lost decades in the light of prescribed policies from the Washington Consensus while another stream of authors has attributed the comparatively low level of economic development in Africa to the continent's over-reliance on foreign aid as well as the ineffectiveness of African governments to negotiate favorable terms of receiving foreign aid (Moyo, 2009; Obeng-Odoom, 2013; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2001 ).
Dominant development models
We discuss this section in three main strands: from the 'Washington Consensus' to the "Beijing Model" through insights into "Liberal Institutional Pluralism and New Structural
Economics". It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the big ideas in the history of African development which have been highlighted in the introduction. What is important to note for the interest of this study is that, over three decades of a neoliberal experiment in the continent has failed to deliver. Accordingly, the continent's contribution to global trade has dropped to under 1.5% from above 3.8% in the 1950s (Fofack, 2014; Asongu & Tchamyou, 2018) 3 . While some have labeled the neoliberal experiment as lost decades (Mkandawire, 2004 (Mkandawire, , 2015 , others have been more radical in qualifying it as the 20 th century economic 3 It is important to note that a drop in the participation of Africa in global trade is not the only evidence of the poor macroeconomic performance of many African development strategies. For instances, according to Fosu (2013b) , some of the conditions for the unfavorable economic performance of African countries are: "administered redistribution", "state breakdown", "state controls", and "suboptimal inter temporal resource allocation". Asongu (2017a Asongu ( , 2017b associate the poor performance to comparatively low levels of knowledge economy while Tchamyou (2019a Tchamyou ( , 2019b consider inequality as a fundamental policy syndrome.
tragedy (Artadi & Sala-i-Martin, 2003) . Some accounts have been more proverbial in stating that, whereas Arthur Lewis (1955) led all developing nations to water, many African countries simply refused to drink (Amavilah, 2014) . These narratives are consistent with the World Bank's (2011) position that the only region in the developing world to miss the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target is Africa (Fofack, 2014) . Post-2015 African-centric literature has confirmed the World Bank's projections that closed to 50% of countries in Africa did not achieve the MDG extreme poverty target (Bicaba et al., 2017; Efobi et al., 2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019) . In light of the above setbacks, scholars have been searching for useful and evidence-based processes of development. Consequently, two new leading paradigms of development that have emerged are: the "New Structural
Economics" (NSE) and the "Liberal Institutional Pluralism" (LIP).
The LIP that focuses on institutions, norms and rules limiting human behavior has been put forward by Brett (2009 ), Rodrik (2008 , Acemoglu et al. (2005) and North (2009) .
From a macroeconomic perspective, the consistency by these authors is tailored towards institutional conditions needed for political transformation and economic prosperity. The central element of the thesis assumes that two factors affect the economic growth of nations: the society's ability to resolve agency problems and, the capacity of institutions to manage individuals' predation. This paradigm received prominence when it was established that longterm economic prosperity was not independently affected by WC policies, once the quality of domestic institutions was taken into account (Easterly & Levine, 2003; Fofack, 2014) .
The NSE that has been presented by: Stiglitz and Lin (2013) , Stiglitz et al. (2013a Stiglitz et al. ( , 2013b , Norman and Stiglitz (2012) , Lin and Monga (2011), and Chang (2002) . They advocate without necessarily working towards a unified economic development theory, for a synthesis of liberalism and structuralism ideology. They have proposed application of an economic approach based on neoclassical economics in a bid to understand the determinants of economic structure and how their evolution affects development. The synthesis involves taking into account both structural characteristics in the understanding of economic development and the mission of the government as a driver of infrastructural development, integration of markets that are essential for economic prosperity. Hence, this new approach has recognized both market and State failures (Fofack, 2014) .
Although it has been criticized in some quarters (Huang, 2010 (Huang, , 2016 , the Chinese development model which advocates for State regulation and prudence in market openness is being recognized as more adapted than the WC to 21 st century development (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013) . Relative to the WC that favors complete free trade, this alternative development approach puts more emphasis on national sovereignty and prudential market reforms (Nijs, 2008; Hlaing & dan Kakinaka, 2018 This strand of the literature is consistent with the view that instead of criticizing the Beijing model, it should be engaged (Kuo, 2012) because the Sino-African nexus is offering new avenues of development that could substantially fight poverty in the continent (Carmody, 2009 ). Wu and Cheng (2010) are supportive of the view that China has special lessons for African due to her achievement of poverty mitigation over the past decades and; China is bringing substantial transformation to Africa via export of entrepreneurial talent and economic dynamism (Friedman, 2009 ). There is indeed an abundant literature on the beneficial nature of Sino-African relations, notably: the reliance on capital goods from China that is positive for sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA's) growth (Munemo, 2013) ; the important role of African agencies (Mohan & Lampert, 2010) ; positive appeals even to resource-poor countries (Ancharaz, 2009 ); a historical and sustainable relationship (Power & Mohan, 2010) ; development of specialized economic zones (Edinger, 2008) and economic diversification and mitigation of negative shocks from natural resource specialization (Diaw & Lassoua, 2013 Accommodation School. These are to the best of our knowledge the main schools of thought that can guide the research.
Schools of thought and arguments
The neocolonial or pessimistic school has been advanced by pessimists of the China the school maintains that the nexus is not always in the interest of African nations. The reference often provided to substantiate this thesis is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 5 from the USA which is hypothesized to go beyond the making of profits by promoting good governance (Clinton, 2011) .
The discourses that sustain the thesis highlight both general and specific conclusions which support a pessimistic perspective of Sino-African relations. The research does not dissociate general from specific conclusions because the purpose of the narrative is to highlight studies that have provided pessimistic conclusions on Sino-African relations. These include, amongst others: Southern Africa's agricultural export sector not positively affected by Chinese prosperity (Villoria, 2009 ); Europe and the USA are increasingly suspicious of the Sino-African nexus and are tailoring measures with which to increase their leverage (Huliaras & Magliveras, 2008) or the nexus being asymmetric from a Western point of view (Alden, 2006) ; Chinese prostitutes are looked-upon as cheap and junk as commodities from China (Ndjio, 2009 ); Chinese trade is rendering African industries very vulnerable (Giovannetti & Sanfilippo, 2009 ); great discontent by workers in Chinese industries (Brooks, 2010) ; investments from China are destroying some African communities like in Sudan (Askouri, 2007) and, driven by the availability of natural resources (Kiggundu, 2008, p. 130) . The relationship would not be beneficial to Africa because of small productive capacities and low degree of diversification (Chemingui & Bchir, 2010) or low levels of industrialization (Power, 4 The Beijing model of development advocates national sovereignty, prudence in market reforms and State regulation (Nijs, 2008) . 5 The AGOA provides incentives for African countries to remain consistent with free market policies.
2008). Human rights violations could be exported to Africa (Brselin & Taylor, 2008; Zhou, 2005) and the nexus may not lead to higher living standards in SSA (Elu & Price, 2010) broadly because of myths surrounding it (Freschi, 2010; De Grauwe et al., 2012; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013) .
The Balanced-Development school postulates that contrary to the first school, the relationship between China and Africa would be symmetrical if African nations can device common policies based on rational economic arguments to balance it (Duclos, 2011) . For instance, the non-interference policy endows governments in the continent with the leverage of consolidating their sovereignty in mutual projects. Three points are central to elucidating this school. First, the Chinese foreign policy of unconditional foreign aid greatly deviates from the Western version which patronizes African countries . In this light, the term "colonialism" used by the pessimistic school to qualify Sino-African relations is very misplaced (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Asongu et al., 2018) . The basis for such misplacement is that the employment of trade and investment as instruments for influencing processes of decision-making in African countries by certain developed countries is similar to some form of neocolonialism. Second, based on the evidence that most African nations and Hence, the two thoughts motivating this school are the following: (i) the dominant models presented to Africa are the WC and BM and (ii) Western nations are no "less neo-colonialist" compared to China (Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Ssozi, 2016) . According to this strand, China is using the same rules of free market competition established by the WC which with respect to most accounts have failed to deliver in Africa (Bartels et al., 2009; Asongu, 2012; Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012) . Hence, the exploitation of Africa's suspicion some Western double standards by China to further her footprint into the continent is politically correct . The bulk of literature sustaining this school of thought include, inter alia:
Drogendijk and Blomkvist (2013), Wissenbach (2009) and Ovadia (2013) . Therefore, based on the above, African countries can leverage on both the WC and the BM.
Agenda: An African Consensus in the Beijing Model and the Washington Consensus
This underlines the relevance of building complementarities.
Building complementarities
Before reconciling schools of thoughts, argument and paradigms, it is relevant to first of all support the need for building complementarities between the WC and BM (Asongu, 2016) . There is a growing body of literature supporting this need, notably: an imperative of building complementarities among traditional development partners, China and Africa (Schiere, 2010) ; companies from China almost have similar motivations as corporations from the West (Drogendijk & Blomkvist, 2013) , especially in terms of FDI (Lin & Farrell, 2013; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011) , experiences in two Zambian sectors (Kragelund, 2009 ), general resource-and market-seeking interests (Zhang et al., 2013; Gu, 2009; Osei & Mubiru, 2010) and compliance with free-market competition standards (Mohan & Tan-Mullins, 2009; Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009 ). In summary, the narrative sustains that the Sino-African nexus is an ineluctable process with a sound historical evolution (Alden & Alves, 2008) that requires some cooperation from traditional development partners for more mutual benefits (Wissenbach, 2009) . A cooperation that would potentially dissipate growing ambivalence on new opportunities for the development of Africa (Mohan & Power, 2008) .
Reconciling schools of thought and paradigms
In this section, we shall first reconcile the schools of thought documented above, with particular emphasis on: the two dominant models of development and the Moyo conjecture.
Then we shall discuss how this reconciliation also reconciles the Liberal institutional pluralism (LIP) and New Structural economics (NSE) paradigms in the second sub-section. A synthesis that at the same time fills some gaps left in the LIP and NSE literature.
Reconciling schools of thought
We engage this sub-section in three main strands: emphasis on preference in rights (human versus (vs) national, idiosyncratic vs sovereign and, political vs economic); linkages between, thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis, schools of thoughts and, dominant development models and; use of the Moyo conjecture to reconcile the BM and the WC.
The first strand discusses concerns on preferences of rights that are the central arguments distinguishing the first-two schools. These include human rights vs national rights , idiosyncratic rights vs sovereign rights (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2014) and;
political rights vs economic rights (Lalountas et al., 2011; Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a) .
Whereas the second sets of rights are consistent with the second school, the first sets dominate narratives of the first school. In essence, the neocolonial or pessimistic or first school in its condemnation of the Chinese foreign policy in Africa broadly prefers human rights over national rights, idiosyncratic rights over sovereign rights and political rights over economic rights. In the same vein, the balanced development or second school which maintains that the Chinese model is valuable for Africa prefers: national rights over human rights, sovereign rights over idiosyncratic rights and economic rights over political rights. First of all, in China's foreign policy, national rights precede human rights. As we have discussed above, Africa in increasingly discontent about the West's selective definition of human of rights. The suspension of foreign aid to Uganda for exercising her national rights to pass an anti-gay bill through the democratic process is a case in point (Asongu, 2014b) .
Second, individual or idiosyncratic rights do not also precede sovereignty rights in the Chinese perspective . Given that African nations have been increasingly humiliated by issues of hegemony, the Chinese perspective is that by standards of international law, sovereign nations should not criticize other sovereign countries on issues that are supported by democratic processes at the domestic level. The narrative should be balanced with the fact that while China in principle advocates for non-interference, there are growing critiques that China is not living-up to this standard of non-interference (Gonzalez-Vicente, 2015). Third, as concerns preferences between 'voting rights' and 'the right to food' which have been the issues of heated debates in a recent stream of studies (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2016) , there is a growing consensus that political rights or institutions are more endogenous to productive structures, economic prosperity or economic rights (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014) .
In the second strand, as previously discussed, the schools of thought documented above can be further classified into the following. The first, pessimistic or neocolonial school which could also be known as the thesis typically sustains the priority of political rights or the Washington consensus. The second or balanced-development school which could also be qualified as an anti-thesis to the first school largely advocates for a Beijing model or priority in economic rights. Lastly, the third or accommodation school could also be viewed as a synthesis suggesting a reconciliation of the WC and the BM.
The third strand largely focuses on discussions over whether economic rights or political rights should come first in the development process. The debate has been reconciled into what we term as the Moyo (2013) conjecture. While Moyo defines the WC as "private capitalism, liberal democracy and priority in political rights", she has also defined the BM as "state capitalism, deemphasized democracy and priority in economic rights". Whereas, political rights priorities are largely the focus of the first school of thought, economic rights are the central element in the second school. The Moyo conjecture maintains that economic rights or the BM should be prioritized in the short-run whereas political rights or the WC should be prioritized in the long-term.
The intuition for the conjecture is that, a sustainable middle class is needed to demand political rights in a sustainable manner (Asongu, 2016; Kodila-Tedika et al., 2016) . Hence, once a burgeoning middle class has been established, the population would automatically demand political rights that would not be tainted by "crony democracy". This is essentially because, this class would no longer be concerned about basic economic rights (of shelter and food) which are largely issues of low-income groups. Since the BM has proven to deliver a burgeoning middle class within a relatively shorter interval relative to the WC, it is suggested by the conjecture to be the better short term model. Asongu (2014a) and Lalountas et al. (2011) have broadly confirmed this conjecture in African and developing countries, respectively.
It is important to devote more space to clarifying the stated sequence of importance in institutions because it is a very strong proposition. The intuition for this sequence is that economic institutions are more relevant than political institutions at the early stages of industrialization. Economic institutions promote the economic rights of citizens, which include, among others: the rights to shelter, clothing, sanitation and health. On the other hand, political institutions are concerned with the election and replacement of political leaders or the rights to vote. Many accounts maintain that the electorates in many African countries are ready to follow any leadership that purchases their votes with a few dollars essential for basic economic needs (Kramon, 2009 ). Hence, it is reasonable to infer that political rights are more endogenous to economic rights at the early stages of economic development. The narrative is consistent with the conclusions of Lalountas et al. (2011) and Asongu (2014a) which sustain that, more emphasis is placed on the political (economic) dimension of globalization in high (low) income countries.
Reconciling paradigms and agenda
The section addresses two main concerns. favors State regulation and prudence in economic openness, the WC suggested for the longterm reflects quite the opposite. On the former contribution, the proposed conjecture is such that, the institutional design for economic development is specifically reflected in the shortterm and long-run models respectively.
We devote space to discussing how the conjecture relates to the NSE in subtle detail.
As substantiated by Fofack (2014) , an interesting challenge in the NSE (Acemoglu et al., 2005) is the absence of a causal linkage between a specific institutional design and economic prosperity. The conjecture addresses this concern by establishing that political (economic)
institutions are more relevant at the later (early) stages of industrialization. This contribution also deviates from the fundamental one-size fits all frameworks that fail to take into account structural needs at each stage of the development process. Hence, the conjecture takes into account local conditions before recommending policy tools. For instance, the right to food is more relevant than the right to vote in low income countries 6 . In a continent where poverty is substantially linked with huge capital flight (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008 Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016 , 2017 Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2017; Asongu, 2014b) , the priority of infrastructural provision by the African Development Bank broadly substantiates the conjecture.
A fundamental assumption of the Moyo conjecture is that the WC is more sustainable than the BM because inequality has increased more with the BM than with the WC. Hence, according to the idea, the WC is more inclusive than the BM. But the relevance of this paradigm has two main shortcomings. First, Piketty (2014) has debunked the Kuznets (1955) inverted u-shaped relationship between industrialization and inequality which is an underlying assumption of the conjecture. Second, even without Piketty (2014) , based on an exclusive Kuznets' perspective, inequality in China would fall with the evolution of industrialization.
Addressing these two highlighted issues is an interesting agenda for further research.
Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions
There is an evolving stream of literature on the false economics of preconditions for policy-making in the African context (Monga, 2014 and market failures but failed to provide a unified theory, the former has left the challenging concern of how institutional diversity affects the development process. We synthesize The exposition has a broad focus and it is essential to clearly articulate sub-themes of the underlying study in future papers. However, it is important to note that this study is positioned as a broad reflection of "views and agenda" from which other lines of inquiry would emerge. Therefore, future studies can extend this study by expanding on various strands of thought covered.
While criticisms can arise on the difficulty of reconciling the schools of thought given that their premises are different, it is worthwhile to note that the LIP and NSE are used in a minimalist approach. For instance, the LIP is used to articulate the perspective that African countries can priorities different types of institutions in the long run and short term while the NSE is used to articulate government-led policies versus market-led economic policies.
Government-led institutions and economic governance are prioritized by the BM while the market-led institutions and political governance are prioritized by the WC. Moreover, whereas conceptions of the LIP and NSE can be broader than considered in the study, the minimalist contextualization of both schools within the framework of WC versus BM is sound.
In the light of the above, while the study acknowledges the limits of attempting to reconcile various strands of the debate, the paper however offers the basis for future studies in advancing the debate, especially in relation to the fact that they are foreign models of development based on the West and China interests in Africa. Hence, an African-based sociology (or model) of development is not taken into account in the study because as clarified in the introduction, the study largely focuses on dominant paradigms and models.
Addressing these caveats in future studies will require empirical and comparative analyses based on macroeconomic and microeconomic data in order to advance scholarship on Sino-African relations.
